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Abstract
We model the bargaining process of parents over custody at the time of divorce.
First we assume an institutional setting where only sole custody is available. In a
second step we reform this institutional setting and introduce the possibility of joint
custody. We show that some parents, who would not be able to ﬁnd an agreement
in the sole custody regime, can ﬁnd an agreement after the reform. Accordingly, our
empirical analysis shows that the introduction of joint custody enables more parents
to divorce by mutual consent. A detailed analysis of court record data reveals that the
reform had no impact on the odds that children are mainly living with their mother.
However, we observe a shift in the determinants of the custody allocation.
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In recent decades, throughout the western world an increasing incidence of divorce could
be observed (OECD, 2007).1 Marital breakdown can have severe economic and social
consequences for all parties involved. Policy-makers and scholars are especially concerned
about the welfare of aﬀected children. Recent economic research has stressed the funda-
mental role of legal institutions at the time of divorce (e.g. Del Boca, 2003). Obviously,
the legal framework constitutes the choice-set and deﬁnes the rules of the divorce process.
Moreover, it can aﬀect the distribution of welfare within non-intact families. Legal institu-
tions determine the families’ post-divorce well-being and should be designed to minimize
the negative consequences of divorce.
A crucial feature of every divorce is the allocation of custody and consequently custody
law is a particular important aspect of the legal framework. In fact, it governs the actual
living arrangement after divorce. Since the 1970s many developed countries have intro-
duced various forms of joint custody after divorce to supplement or to replace sole custody
arrangements.2 One typically distinguishes between joint legal custody and joint physical
custody. Joint legal custody means that both parents share the right and the obligation of
making major decisions about their child’s upbringing (e.g. about schooling, religion, and
health care.) Joint physical custody means that the child spends a signiﬁcant amount of
time with each parent. In any case policy-makers intended thereby to mitigate the pain of
divorce for all parties involved. Since then an ongoing debate – across academic disciplines
including economics, law, psychology and sociology – between proponents and opponents
of joint custody has started. Researchers have primarily focused on the eﬀect of diﬀerent
custody arrangements on children’s well being after divorce. Proponents of joint custody
typically argue that children beneﬁt from ongoing support and resources from both par-
ents. This is captured in various dimensions such as behavioral and emotional adjustment
(Bauserman, 2002), economic well-being (Seltzer, 1991; Del Boca and Ribero, 1998), ed-
ucational attainment (Teng Wah, 2006) and parental involvement (Bowman and Ahrons,
1985; Huang, Han and Garﬁnkel, 2003) among others. Opponents object that children
under joint custody are exposed to ongoing parental conﬂict (Kuehl, 1989). However, the
causal relationship between certain custody arrangements and child outcomes is far from
clear and the empirical evidence is mostly inconclusive.
In this paper, we go one step back in order to make progress in a comprehensive evalu-
ation of joint custody. We analyze the immediate eﬀects of joint custody at the time of
divorce. In particular, we focus on the impact of joint custody on the divorce process.
1However, in the United States the divorce rate peaked in the early 1980s and has been declining since
then (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2007a,b).
2In the United States joint custody was ﬁrst introduced in Indiana in 1973 and has since then spread to
nearly all states (Brinig and Buckley, 1998). In Europe, joint custody has been introduced, for instance,
in Sweden in 1976 (J¨ anter¨ a-Jareborg, 2003), in Norway in 1981 (Sverdrup and Lødrup, 2003), in Germany
in 1997 (Dethloﬀ and Martiny, 2003) and in Austria in 2001 (Roth, 2003).
2The arrangements at the time of divorce are decisive for post-divorce development and
outcomes. Therefore, we model the bargaining process of parents over custody at the time
of divorce.3 First we assume an institutional setting where only sole custody is available.
In a second step we reform this institutional setting and introduce the possibility of joint
custody. The bargaining process is characterized by alternating oﬀers. Parents are impa-
tient but want to ﬁnd a custody agreement that allows both to be better oﬀ than with
having the judge assign custody. We show that some parents, who would not be able to
ﬁnd an agreement in a sole custody regime, can ﬁnd an agreement after a joint custody
reform. This is a striking argument in favor of joint custody.
In the empirical part of the paper we present evidence which supports our model’s pre-
diction. Exploiting the control group nature of couples without minors we show that the
introduction of joint custody in Austria has increased the fraction of divorces by mutual
consent. In addition, we employ rich micro data of court records to explore in detail the
bargaining process of parents over custody before and after this reform. While the cus-
tody reform has not changed the odds that children are (mainly) living in the mother’s
household after divorce, we observe that the reform has altered the determinants of this
allocation. In sum, the results indicate that the additional option of joint custody has a
mediating eﬀect on the divorce process. The introduction of joint custody substantially
reduces monetary and emotional cost of divorce. A larger fraction of couples is now able
to ﬁnd a custody agreement without heavily resorting to courtroom adjudication. This
minimizes both private and public cost of litigation.
Whether joint custody has apart from that desirable eﬀects is an open issue. However,
in the ﬁnal section of the paper we highlight that parents with favorable characteristics
self-select themselves into joint custody. This ﬁnding is of particular importance for other
studies analyzing the eﬀect of joint custody on various (child) outcomes. We discuss
potential identiﬁcation strategies for future research.
Apart from the literature studying the eﬀect of joint custody after divorce a couple of
papers are related to our theoretical work. Cooter, Marks and Mnookin (1982) use a bar-
gaining model with alternating oﬀers to model negotiations that are inﬂuenced by the
legal situation, but they do not explicitly refer to divorce and custody. They ﬁnd that
optimism about the outcome in court as well as uncertainty about how much the other
party is willing to concede during negotiations can lead to a trial instead of an agreement
between the parties. Mnookin and Kornhauser (1979) refer explicitly to divorce, but do
not use an explicit model. They examine in detail how the legal situation at divorce inﬂu-
ences a couple’s bargaining over the division of matrimonial property, comprising tangible
and intangible assets. They show that the judge’s preferences over diﬀerent arrangements
aﬀect the parents’ bargaining behavior. Fella, Manzini and Mariotti (2004) derive an ex-
plicit bargaining model between spouses where the transferability of matrimonial property
3Rasul (2006) and Francesconi and Muthoo (2003) model the allocation of child custody as a prenuptial
contract.
3serves as a crucial determinant of whether to divorce or not. Within this model they ex-
amine the eﬃciency of diﬀerent divorce laws. In our paper we take the divorce decision
as given and investigate how parents bargain over custody under diﬀerent custody law
regimes.
2 A bargaining model of the custody allocation
To model the bargaining process over custody, we presume that parents have to ﬁnd a
custody arrangement for their minor in order to dissolve marriage legally.4 Preferably they
agree on it, but if they are not able to ﬁnd any agreement, a judge assigns sole custody
to one parent. There are two diﬀerent types of divorce available: (i) divorce by mutual
consent and (ii) divorce by fault. Divorce by mutual consent is cheaper and easier to
obtain than divorce by fault, but it requires that parents cooperate and ﬁnd a mutually
binding agreement concerning custody. If parents do not manage to agree they have to
proceed with divorce by fault. In order to ﬁnd an agreement, parents can bargain over the
custody allocation.5 Firstly, we assume a sole custody regime where parents can choose
from two possible arrangements. They can assign sole custody either to the mother or to
the father. Then we introduce the possibility of joint custody. In particular, we consider
a combination of joint legal and joint physical custody. After the reform the parents can
choose from four possible arrangements. The minor can live with either parent in a sole
custody or in a joint custody, where the parents have to choose a main residence for the
child.6 However, parents can only keep joint custody with an explicit agreement to do so.
Since the available type of divorce depends on whether the parents can ﬁnd an agreement
or not, the bargaining over custody has to take place before ﬁling for divorce.
The negotiation over custody can be modeled in the following way, which is based on
Rubinstein (1982). The parents i ∈ N = {m,f} have preferences over time T and over a set
of agreements X.7 There are two agreements x in the sole custody regime XS = {mS,fS}
and four agreements x after the joint custody reform XJ = {mS,fS,mJ,fJ}, where S
stands for sole custody and J for joint custody. Each agreement leads to a certain amount
of utility for each parent, which is discounted according to the time t ∈ T = {0,1,2...,tC}
that it has taken to come to the agreement. We assume that parents have constant discount
rates δi ∈ [0,1], so that the utility of parent i of an agreement x that has been found at
4We assume that there is only one minor to simplify the negotiation and rule out the case where parents
split their children.
5The negotiation at divorce typically includes the division of the whole matrimonial property. Therefore,
divorce settlements include, beside the allocation of custody, an agreement on monetary issues such as the
division of assets, alimony awards and child support payments. In the bargaining model we solely focus
on the allocation of custody under diﬀerent regimes. We disregard monetary issues since they aﬀect the
allocation of custody in each regime equally. However, we will pick up this issue in the empirical part of
the paper.
6Consequently, we refer to the parent where the child is living mainly in a joint custody as the resident
parent. In section 2.4 we will discuss varying legal systems.
7The terms m and f can stand for mother and father or for male and female.
4time t is given by ui(x,t) = δt
iui(x). Furthermore, parents are completely and perfectly
informed about each others preferences due to their closeness during marriage.
The parents have to follow certain rules in the bargaining process. We arbitrarily assume
that parent m makes the ﬁrst proposal x out of the set of agreements X. The parents then
alternate in making oﬀers, which the other parent can accept (which ends the game) or
reject (which leads to a new period and a new oﬀer). Moreover, in each period the parent
who decides about an oﬀer can opt out (which also ends the game) and let the judge assign
custody, henceforth called ‘going to court’.8 The negotiation does not go on indeﬁnitely. It
ends in period tC with an assignment by the judge. This date is set exogenously before the
negotiation begins. It can be an appointment at court, that is set before the negotiation
starts and at which the arrangement has to be ﬁxed. In period tC the judge assigns sole
custody to parent m with probability p and to parent f with probability (1 − p).9 This






i + (1 − p)U
fS
i − εi] for parent i, where εi are
additional monetary and emotional cost of a divorce by fault compared to a divorce by
mutual consent – for short, cost of disagreement.10 When a parent ends the game by
opting out, the same lottery less the cost of disagreement applies as in the case of an
exogenous end of the negotiation, [pUmS
i +(1−p)U
fS
i −εi], but now utility is discounted
to a smaller degree, since the game ends sooner and less cost of waiting occur. Every game
consists of a set of histories H, where a history h ∈ H is composed of a series of proposals
and reactions to them. The utility of a parent of a certain outcome (x,t) does not depend
on the history though, but only on the agreement x and on the point in time t when it was
agreed upon. In order to rank the utilities of the parents we have to make assumptions
about their preferences: (i) Preferences are stationary; (x,t) i (y,t+1) iﬀ (x,0) i (y,1)
and (x,t) i (y,t) iﬀ (x,0) i (y,0). (ii) Parents prefer to reach an outcome as soon as
possible, due to the discounting of the utility; (x,t) i (x,t+1). (iii) If an agreement x is
preferred to agreement y, then each parent will wait for one period to achieve the preferred
agreement as opposed to getting the less preferred agreement now; (x,t + 1) i (y,t) iﬀ
(x,t) i (y,t).
Given the model’s setup and these assumptions it remains to specify the utility orderings
of the parents. The utility orderings depend on the set of agreements, which in turn
depends on the custody regime. In the next section we specify the utility orderings for
the baseline case of a sole custody regime and then solve the model for subgame-perfect
Nash-equilibria.11 After that we discuss the bargaining in a joint custody regime. We will
8If going to court was a possible agreement, instead of an outside option, the results would not change.
9The parents can deduce the probability from former court rulings in similar cases. We assume that
both parents have access to the same information and, therefore, form similar beliefs about the probability
p. This rules optimism of both parents out.
10Emotional cost could result from parents internalizing the utility of the child, which would be lower in
case of divorce by fault compared to divorce by mutual consent due to the ongoing disagreements of the
parents. We assume that the cost of disagreement do not vary over time.
11By concentrating on subgame-perfect Nash-equilibria instead of Nash-equilibria we exclude equilibria
with non-credible threats.
5then compare the outcomes of the two regimes to identify the eﬀect of allowing for joint
custody after divorce.
2.1 Solving the model in a sole custody regime
In a sole custody regime the utility ordering of each parent includes two possible agree-
ments XS = {mS,fS} and the outside option of going to court (the exogenous end of
the game). We assume that having custody leads to a higher utility for each parent i
than giving custody to the other parent.12 The outside option of going to court yields an
expected utility between the two agreements, as it is not clear who will become custodian.
The lottery itself leads to a higher utility level than going to court since no cost of dis-











Whether the utility of the outside option is larger or smaller than the utility of the other
parent having custody depends on the relative magnitudes of p and εi. If the probability
of becoming custodian is large enough and/or the cost of disagreement are small enough,
then parent i prefers going to court instead of agreeing to give custody to the other
parent. The two possible utility orderings for each parent lead to four possible situations.
These situations and their solutions are summarized in Table1. The situations have three
diﬀerent outcomes: (i) The parents do not agree and go to court immediately. (ii) The
parents ﬁnd a single agreement in the ﬁrst period t = 0. (iii) The parents ﬁnd an agreement
immediately, but it depends on who can make the ﬁrst proposal and on their relative
(im)patience which parent can get her/his preferred agreement. In a real setting, one
may associate the right for the ﬁrst proposal and high patience with any given advantage.
For simplicity, we will refer to it as relative bargaining power. The model is solved by
Table 1: Summary of the results in a sole custody regime.
f
fS  C  mS fS  mS  C
mS  C  fS C mS
m
mS  fS  C fS mS / fS
backward-induction: The parents know that eventually (at the exogenous end of the game)
12This analysis assumes – as most economic analyzes of the family do (e.g. Becker, 1993; Ermisch, 2003)
– that parents are altruistic towards their children in the sense that their utility depends on the welfare of
their children. Therefore, it seems to be a natural starting point that parents are interested in spending
time with their children and that they want to remain custodian after divorce. However, other preference
orderings would not change the basic result.
6the judge will assign custody to one of them. The parents want to improve their situation
(i.e. increase their utilities) by ﬁnding an agreement that is better for both of them, or at
least by going to court immediately (which saves the cost of waiting).
Case1 When the subset of possible agreements X∗ ⊆ X, which contains only those
agreements that both parents prefer to the outside option, is empty the parents cannot ﬁnd
an agreement and go to court immediately.
The optimal strategy for each parent in this case is to propose that the child should be
living with her/himself, and not to accept the equivalent proposal of the other parent. This
means that the game could go on until the exogenous end, with each parent proposing
her/himself as custodian and rejecting the proposals of the other parent. Therefore, it is





i , parent m, who by deﬁnition starts the game, will propose mS
and parent f goes to court immediately to save the cost of waiting.
Case2 When the subset of possible agreements X∗ is not empty and both parents prefer
the same possible agreement, i.e. x∗
i = x∗
j = x∗ ∈ X∗, where x∗
i ∈ X∗ is the agreement that
parent i values most highly of all the agreements that both parents prefer to the outside
option, then the parents come to the agreement x∗ immediately.
Again, the parents try to ﬁnd an agreement which increases the utility of both of them
compared to the eventual assignment by the judge. In this case agreement x∗ not only
improves the utility of both parents, it is also the preferred agreement of both within
the subset of possible agreements X∗. Therefore, the optimal strategy for each parent









j where iS is equal to the preferred possible
agreement of both parents (x∗) and the only element of the subset of possible agreements
X∗. Therefore, parent i, who has the higher valuation of the outside option, gets custody
immediately.
Case3 When the subset of possible agreements X∗ is not empty and the parents prefer




j ∈ X∗, then there are two possible
outcomes x∗
i and x∗
j. In this case the outcome depends on the relative bargaining power of
the parents.
A priori it is not clear which of the two agreements the parents will choose. It depends on
which parent will eventually give in. This in turn is determined by the degree of patience
of the parents (δi) and by which parent can make the last proposal – or for short by their





i . Both parents have high cost of disagreement and/or a relatively low –
and therefore relatively equal – probability to get custody assigned by the judge. In this
13Impatience can result from altruism of the parents toward their child, since they internalize that the
child suﬀers from ongoing disputes. Therefore, it is closely related to the emotional cost of disagreement.
7case both parents prefer mS or fS over the exogenous end of the negotiation. Depending
on whether parent m or parent f has the relative higher bargaining power the solution
will be mS or fS.14
2.2 Solving the model in a joint custody regime
For the the joint custody regime we have to make some assumptions on the preference
orderings over sole custody, joint custody and going to court. Firstly, we assume that each
parent prefers that the child is (mainly) living with her/him. However, given that parents
may either prefer to be sole custodian or resident parent and share parental rights and
obligations under a joint custody with the former spouse. Secondly, given that the child
is (mainly) living with the other spouse each parent i wants to be integrated into a joint
custody, so that jJ i jS. Therefore, we have two diﬀerent possible utility orderings for
the set of agreements XJ = {mS,fS,mJ,fJ}. Incorporating the outside option leads to
a total of seven diﬀerent utility orderings for each parent, as the utility of going to court
relatively to the other utilities varies with the probability p to get custody assigned by
the judge and the cost of disagreement εi. There are four possible utility orderings with a




























































This results in 49 diﬀerent situations, for which the solutions are summarized in Table2.
However, the analysis can easily be simpliﬁed since there are again only three possible
outcomes: (i) There is no agreement from which both parents proﬁt, so that the parents
go to court immediately (Case1). (ii) They ﬁnd a single agreement which improves the
situation for both parents (Case2). (iii) There are two possible agreements which the
parents may choose, because they have diﬀerent preferences over the subset of possible















f are an example of Case1. The parents cannot ﬁnd any
14Refer to the Appendix A for a detailed analysis of relative bargaining power and its eﬀects on the
chosen agreement.
15Going to court cannot yield a higher utility than getting a sole custody by agreement due to the lottery
pU
mS
i + (1 − p)U
fS
i and the additional cost of disagreement εi.
8Table 2: Summary of the results after the joint custody reform.a
f
fS  fS  fS  fS  fJ  fJ  fJ 
C  fJ  fJ  fJ  fS  fS  fS 
fJ  C  mJ  mJ  C  mJ  mJ 
mJ  mJ  C  mS  mJ  C  mS 
mS mS mS C mS mS C
mS  C  mJ
 fJ  fS
C C C mS C C mS
mS  mJ  C mS/ mS/





mS  mJ  fJ mJ/ mS/ mJ/ mS/





mS  mJ  fJ fJ/ mJ/ mS/ mJ/ mS/ m





mJ  mS  C
 fJ  fS
C C mJ mJ C mJ mJ
mJ  mS  fJ mJ/ mJ/ mJ/ mJ/





mJ  mS  fJ fJ/ mJ/ mJ/ mJ/ mJ/





a The white cells in this table correspond to the upper left case in Table1; the light grey cells to the
upper right and lower left case; and the dark grey cells correspond to the lower right case in Table1.
agreement which leads to a higher utility than the outside option for both of them. For
parent f only fS yields a higher utility, but for parent m this agreement is worse than
going to court. Any other agreement which leads to a higher utility for parent m yield a
lower utility than the outside option for parent f. Therefore, the parents will go to court















f . In this case, there are two agreements which lead to a
higher utility than going to court for both parents, namely fJ and fS. Since both parents
prefer fJ over fS they will agree on fJ immediately. One case which leads to an outcome















f . The parents will agree on mJ (fJ) if parent m
(f) has the relative higher bargaining power.16
2.3 Changes due to the joint custody reform
The introduction of joint custody as an additional custody arrangement beside sole custody
does not change the parents’ way of bargaining. However, the outcome of the negotiation
may change. To study these changes, we compare the outcome of a certain couple under
16In fact fJ is not the most preferred agreement of parent f in the set of agreements (it is only second-
best here), but it is the ﬁrst-best agreement in the subset of possible agreements.
9the joint custody regime with that this couple would have found under the sole custody
regime. Most importantly, it turns out that some parents who would not be able to ﬁnd
an agreement in a sole custody regime (Case1) can ﬁnd an agreement after the reform.
Let us ﬁrst consider the two situations from the sole custody regime where parents ﬁnd
an agreement immediately (Case2). These two situations, where parents have a diﬀerent
valuation of the outside option, can be distinguished into ten situations each in a regime
with joint custody depicted by the light grey cells in Table2. After the reform parents still
manage to ﬁnd an agreement immediately. However, here are now two possible outcomes
in some situations, which improve the utility of both parents compared to going to court.
The situation where the parents ﬁnd more than one possible agreement in the sole custody
regime (Case3) can be distinguished into four situations after the introduction of joint
custody (dark grey cells in Table2). All four agreements are better than going to court for
both parents. The single situation without agreement in the sole custody regime (Case1)
can be distinguished into 25 situations in the joint custody regime (white cells in Table2).
In 12 out of these 25 situations parents can ﬁnd at least one agreement, even though this
would have not been possible before the reform. Of course, these agreements are exactly
the additional ones containing joint custody. If an agreement on sole custody is possible,
then it would have been possible without allowing for joint custody as well. The aﬀected
group are the parents preferring any joint custody agreement compared to a sole custody
of the other parent.
Two further points are worth noting: Firstly, considering all possible preference orderings
each of the available agreements after the reform, XJ = {mS,fS,mJ,fJ}, is a possible
outcome. Secondly, the comparison of the types of outcome in the two regimes shows that
some of the parents who ﬁnd an agreement (on sole custody) in the sole custody regime,
prefer a joint custody arrangement after the reform. These parents are the ones where at
least one of them (the one with the higher bargaining power) can improve her/his utility
with a joint custody arrangement as compared to a sole custody one.
2.4 Varying legal systems
In this section we show that our model can be easily adapted to other legal systems. The
most important aspects of modeling where adaptations may apply are (i) the available
types of divorce, (ii) the concrete type of joint custody and (iii) the oﬃcial channel to
maintain joint custody.
Ad (i): The legal system may provide a type of divorce where the monetary cost are
independent of the parents’ ability to agree on custody. In that case the cost of disagree-
ment εi only consist of emotional cost.17 This implies that the cost of disagreement are
17If the trial lasts longer due to a dispute, then εi may contain monetary cost as well, but the baseline
monetary cost are the same and therefore they do not appear in the cost of disagreement.
10comparable lower (provided that the emotional cost are similar). Therefore, the rank of
going to court will be higher compared to the case modeled above and divorces without
agreement will be more likely.
Ad (ii): Consider a legal system which provides an equally shared joint physical custody.
That means, parents do not have to agree on a resident parent, since law intends that the
child spends equally or close to half the time with each of her/his parents. In this case
there are only three agreements after the reform, X0
J = {mS,fS,J0}, and the number of
possible utility orderings per parent is reduced from seven to ﬁve. Consequently, there are
only 25 diﬀerent situations in the model instead of 49.
Ad (iii): In some legal systems joint custody is the default option instead of being a
possible arrangement. In this case, divorcing parents keep joint custody, except for the
case where one or both of the parents apply to the court to assign custody. If the judge
can assign sole or a joint custody the outcome of going to court is even more uncertain
than in the case modeled above. This leads to a lower valuation of the outside option.
Nevertheless, the same 49 situations may result.
Modifying the model in the proposed ways does not lead to changes in the principles
of how the parents negotiate or in their ability to cooperate. Only the chosen custody
arrangement in a speciﬁc situation may change. Therefore, the result that introducing
joint custody facilitates ﬁnding an agreement still holds.
2.5 Further policy implications
The cost of disagreement εi and the probability p aﬀect the parents’ valuation of the
outside option. The lower the probability of assignment and the higher the cost of dis-
agreement, the lower is the expected utility of going to court. A low valuation of the
outside option in turn promotes cooperation and should increase the incidence of mutu-
ally binding arrangements. This fact can be used to design an institutional setting which
promotes cooperation of parents and leads to the following policy implication: An (about)
equal probability for both parents to get custody assigned by the judge and monetary cost
of a divorce depending on the parents’ willingness to cooperate. In particular, we suggest
that maternal/paternal preference rules for custody should be replaced by neutral rules
(e.g. the ‘best interest of the child’ rule). In addition, monetary cost of divorce by mutual
consent should be signiﬁcantly lower compared to those of a divorce by fault.
3 Empirical analysis
In the empirical part of the paper we employ Austrian data. Austria is a particular suitable
case since it had a recent reform (in the year 2001) of its custody law and a unique data set
11of court records, which captures the period before and after the reform, is available. The
aim of our empirical analysis is threefold. Firstly, we test the model’s prediction, namely
that the introduction of joint custody facilitates cooperation between parents with data
from the Austrian Statistical Oﬃce. Secondly, we examine the divorce process of divorces
by mutual consent before and after the reform with the court record data in more detail.
In particular, we test whether the custody reform has changed the odds that the mother
becomes custodian/resident parent and whether the reform has altered the determinants
of this allocation. Thirdly, we characterize the couples who agree on joint custody after
the reform.
3.1 Testing the bargaining model
Our bargaining model predicts that by switching from a sole custody regime to a joint
custody regime parents should be able to ﬁnd a custody agreement more easily. Con-
sequently, the introduction of joint custody should enable additional parents to divorce
by mutual consent. In this section we present evidence that the joint custody reform in
Austria on the 1st of July 2001 indeed led to an increase of the fraction of divorces by
mutual consent and therefore to a decrease of the fraction of divorces by fault.
We employ data that has been retrieved from the Austrian Statistical Oﬃce database.
District Courts have jurisdiction over divorce proceedings and report every single divorce
case with its basic data to the Austrian Statistical Oﬃce. Unfortunately, the data is
available on a Federal State level only. However, the completeness and accuracy of this
administrative database is its striking advantage. We assembled a panel data set for the
nine Austrian Federal States for the years 1991 to 2006. This balanced panel data set with
144 observations comprises ten years before the reform, the year of the reform (2001) and
ﬁve years after the reform. In a ﬁrst step we estimate a panel ﬁxed eﬀects model where
the dependent variable is the percentage of divorces by mutual consent (DMCs,t) in state




αs + βt + γJCt [+δDLt + ζDs,t] + εs,t, (4)
where
P
s αs are state ﬁxed eﬀects and βt captures a time trend. The explanatory vari-
able of primary interest is JCt which captures the period after the reform including the
whole year 2001. We cannot distinguish the ﬁrst half of the year 2001 (before the reform
came into eﬀect) from the later half, because we only have yearly data.18 In an additional
speciﬁcation (Ib) we control for the period before the divorce law reform from the year
1999 (DLt). This reform abolished adultery and the refusal to have children as so-called
absolute reasons for divorce but had no inﬂuence on custody law. For completeness, we
also consider the possibility that the introduction of joint custody had an impact on the
18However, in order to check the robustness of our results we dropped the observations of the year 2001a
nd the qualitative results did not change.
12incidence of divorce. Therefore, we ran a third speciﬁcation (Ic) where we include the
number of divorces per 1,000 residents (Ds,t) as an additional control variable. Moreover,
we re-ran all three speciﬁcations where we allow for state-speciﬁc time trends (speciﬁca-
tions IIa-IIc). We use population weights for our estimations and robust standard errors
are calculated throughout, allowing for clustering by state.19 The results for our six es-
timations of the share of divorces by mutual consent are summarized in Table 5. Each
speciﬁcation shows a positive and a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect of the introduction of
joint custody on the share of divorces by mutual consent. The richer speciﬁcations sug-
gest an increase of about 1.7 percentage points. This eﬀect is quantitatively important
since in the year 2000 already 90 percent of all divorces were divorces by mutual consent
(Statistik Austria, 2003).
Control group approach While there is no evidence that the timing of joint custody reform
was endogenous, i.e. it was introduced in a period of an increasing share of divorces by
mutual consent, we provide additional results where we exploit the control group nature
of couples without minors. The estimation results above are based on a sample of all
divorcing couples (with and without minors). The joint custody reform, however, does
only apply to couples with minors at the time of divorce and should have no impact
on couples without. Therefore, couples without minors constitute a clear control group.
While, we do not have separate ﬁgures for the share of divorces by mutual consent for
couples with and without minors we can exploit the variation of number of divorces with
minors across states. In each year we rank the states according to their average number
of minors per divorce. Based on this ranking we build three groups: states with a low,
with a medium and with a high number of minors per divorce. For each group we deﬁne
a binary variable Ml
t, Mm
t and Mh
t which is equal to one if the state belongs in year t to
the group with a low, a medium or a high number of minors per divorce. Notably, there
is variation in the composition of these three groups over time.20 Compared to equation
(4) we substitute the joint custody reform dummy with the binary variables identifying








t + γmJCt × Mm
t + γhJCt × Mh
t
[+δDLt + ζDs,t] + εs,t.
(5)
The base group is now equal to the group with a low number of minors for the period before
the reform. The idea is that the eﬀect of the joint custody reform should increase with
the average number of minors per divorce (i.e. with the share of the treatment group).
19We have tested the potential eﬀect of the custody reform on the incidence of divorce in a separate
panel ﬁxed-eﬀects model too. We estimated a panel model for the number of divorces per 1,000 residents
in state s in year t for the years 1991 to 2006 (see Table 4). Neither speciﬁcation shows a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the custody law reform on the number of divorces.
20Only the Federal State of Vienna is in each year in the group with the lowest average number of minors
per divorce.
13Accordingly, we expect ˆ γl < ˆ γm < ˆ γh. The estimation results (in Table 6) indeed show
that the quantitative eﬀect of the joint custody reform on the share of divorces by mutual
consent increases with the number of minors. For instance, considering speciﬁcation (IIb)
we ﬁnd for the group with the lowest number of minors an eﬀect of the joint custody
reform of about 1.6 percentage points. For the group with a medium number of minors
the eﬀect is equal to 1.9 percentage points. Finally, for the group with the highest number
of minors we obtain the largest eﬀect of two percentage points. The average number of
minors had no eﬀect on the share of divorces by mutual consent before the reform. These
estimated coeﬃcients are strong support for the causal interpretation of our results.21
Taken together, the results provide convincing evidence that the introduction of joint
custody led to qualitatively signiﬁcant increase in divorces by mutual consent.
3.2 Who gets custody?
So far we have presented evidence that the introduction of joint custody has increased
the share of parents who ﬁnd an agreement and lead to more divorces by mutual consent.
In this section we examine the divorce process of divorces by mutual consent before and
after the reform in more detail. We test whether the custody reform has changed the
probability that the mother becomes custodian/resident parent and whether the reform
has altered the determinants of this allocation. Our empirical analysis in this section is
based on rich micro data from Austrian court records.22
We have collected information on 7,062 divorce cases from ﬁve district courts in Aus-
tria.23 These divorces were initiated between 1997 and 2003, and completed by May 2004.
A divorce record is an oﬃcial record comprising all relevant information on the case.
21To check the robustness of our results we reﬁne our control group. According to Austrian legal practice
children above 14 years of age have the right to choose their primary place of residence. The judge will
only act against the child’s wishes if her/his well-being is endangered. Therefore, it seems plausible that
the number of children below 14 years of age is more decisive for our analysis (compared to the average
number of minors, i.e. children below the age of 19). The allocation of custody should not complicate
the conﬂict between parents and the divorce process if the child’s will is pivotal anyway. Therefore, we
replicate our analysis for the average number of children below 14 years of age (see Table 7). According
to our expectation the results show the same patterns, however, with increased statistical signiﬁcance.
22Please note, we could not use this data set to study the impact of the joint custody reform on the share
of divorces by mutual consent compared to the divorces by fault in the last section, since divorces by fault
are undersampled in this data set. While in the period from 1997 to 2003 on average about 10 percent of
all divorces where divorces by fault in the relevant federal states, we observe in our data set only about 2
percent divorces by fault. This is due to the fact that the access to divorce records of divorces by fault at
the data collection was on average more diﬃcult compared to that of divorce records covering divorces by
mutual consent. Divorces by fault are on average under longer examination and sent to other courts more
often. On top of that divorce records covering divorces by fault very often lack essential information, since
parents agree on some issues in other proceedings documented in separate records. While this fact causes
no problem for the analysis in this sections, it would have biased the results above.
23The courts were selected to represent rural and urban areas. The courts which gratefully cooperated
with compiling the data were Hall, Kitzbuehel, Kufstein, Linz, and the district of Favoriten in Vienna. Data
were collected on nearly all divorces in the period in the courts in Hall and Kitzb¨ uhel. In Kufstein data of
about 90 per cent of all cases could be collected. In Linz and Vienna (Favoriten) data of approximately
80 percent of all divorces could be collected.
14Therefore, a divorce record consists of socio-economic information on the whole family,
transcripts of all proceedings, the correspondence between the litigants and the court,
diﬀerent certiﬁcates and the judgment or the settlement. Since we are only interested in
divorces by mutual consent with minors we exclude all observations on divorces by fault
and cases without minors. As the unit of interest we use the oldest minor in every family
which leads to 3,242 observations.24 Table 3 shows that before the joint custody reform
about 90 percent of the minors lived with their mother after the divorce and about 10
percent with their father.25 Similarly, after the reform about 91 percent of the minors are
(mainly) living with their mother and 9 percent with their father, but 45 percent of all
parents have agreed upon joint custody. These simple descriptive statistics hint that the
Table 3: Share of diﬀerent custody arrangements for oldest minor.
Before After
the reform the reform Overall
Sole custody by mother 90.29 50.63 77.58
Sole custody by father 9.71 4.33 7.99
Joint custody, mainly living with mother - 40.33 12.92
Joint custody, mainly living with father - 4.72 1.51
Number of oldest minors 2,203 1,039 3,242
share of minors (mainly) living in the mother’s household after divorce has not changed
due to the reform. However, in order to get a more in-depth answer we employ data
from the whole time period and estimate a probit model explaining the probability that
the father becomes custodian/resident parent. In other words we explain the probability
that the child is (mainly) living in the father’s household. As the explanatory variable
of primary interest we include a binary variable capturing the period after the reform.
As additional control variables we employ information on the child’s sex and the child’s
age, on the parents’ income, on their education, on their number of joint children, on the
length of their marriage, on their former marriages, on the usage of lawyers and whether
the mother has been a homemaker.26 Further we control for the judge’s sex, for the courts
where divorce took place, as well as for the month and the year of divorce.27 Table8
24We have excluded all cases with a-typical custody arrangements where, for instance, grandparents
became custodians.
25Taking all minors into account leads to virtually the same picture since there are hardly any cases where
minors are ‘split’ between parents, i.e. that minors within one family have diﬀerent custodians/resident
parents.
26There are only four fathers in the whole data set who are homemakers.
27Unfortunately information on income is missing frequently, especially for mothers. In 22 percent of the
cases there is no information on both parents’ income. In 50 percent of the cases only the mother’s, and
in 10 percent of the cases only the father’s income is missing. In the remaining 18 percent of the cases we
have complete information on both parents’ income. Fortunately, we have very detailed information on the
parents’ occupation which allow us to impute for missing incomes based on multivariate OLS-regressions.
The imputed incomes in our estimation analysis below are based on separate regressions for males and
females. In each estimation below we control with binary variables for the cases with missing income and
we will report on the robustness of our results due to imputation. Based on the sample of all couples with
at least one minor child at the time of divorce we imputed in 32 percent of the cases for the father’s income
15provides descriptive statistics for all covariates. The estimation results are summarized
in columns1 and 2 of Table9. The eﬀect of the custody reform is positive but basically
insigniﬁcant (p-value= 0.104). The estimations results aﬃrm the descriptive statistics.
3.3 Determinants of the allocation of custody
To examine the determinants of the allocation of custody before and after the reform we
split the sample. For the period before the reform the estimation strategy is obvious and we
estimate a probit model. After the reform the situation is less clear. One could argue that
the custody allocation has now two dimensions: The parents can ﬁrst choose between sole
and joint custody, and secondly they have to agree on a custodial or a resident parent. This
results in an estimation strategy with two binary decisions. Consequently, we estimate
a bivariate probit model on the joint determination of who becomes resident/custodial
parent (mother vs. father) and the custody type (sole vs. joint). This estimation procedure
allows for a correlation between the two error terms of these equations.28 The results from
the conventional probit estimation for the period before the reform are listed in columns
4 to 6 of Table9. The dependent variable takes on the value one if the father is the sole
custodian and zero if the mother is the sole custodian. Columns7 to 12 summarize the
estimation results of the bivariate probit model. In this section we consider the results
of the ﬁrst equation (columns7 to 9), where the dependent variable is equal to one if the
child is mainly living in the father’s household, and zero otherwise. Comparing these two
estimations we focus on the comparison of the determinants of the child’s main place of
residence under the two regimes.
The outside option Since we only consider divorces by mutual consent the custody alloca-
tions we observe in our data are deﬁnitely the outcome of an agreement of the parents and
not due to a judgment. Nevertheless, according to our theoretical considerations we should
ﬁnd that the allocation of custody in divorces by mutual consent to be inﬂuenced by the
outside option (probability of assignment and cost of disagreement for the counterfactual
case of a divorce by fault). For instance, a high probability for parent i leads to a higher
valuation of the outside option and it is therefore easier for parent i to get the preferred
and in 72 percent of the cases for the mother’s income. The explanatory variables in these two regressions
comprise age at marriage, age at the birth of the ﬁrst child, dummy variables for the diﬀerent occupations
(unskilled blue collar worker, skilled blue collar worker or craftsman, white collar worker, civil servant,
self-employed, etc.), for the place of birth, for citizenship and for the place of residence (zip code). All
coeﬃcients show the expected sign and are of reasonable size. The predictive power of these two regressions
is quite good with an R
2 of 0.53 for the regression of the females and of 0.17 for the regression of the males.
All estimation results which are discussed but not presented in the paper are of course available upon
request.
28Alternatively, one could argue that the custody decision has four dimensions after the reform, since
there are now four diﬀerent custody arrangements available: the mother gets sole custody, the father gets
sole custody, joint custody with the mother as resident parent and joint custody with the father as resident
parent. This view results in a multinomial choice model. We have calculated a multinomial probit model.
These estimation results from this are consistent with those from the bivariate probit model discussed
below, however, provide no additional insights.
16custody agreement. Parents can deduce the probability of assignment p from former di-
vorces by fault. According to Austrian legal practice derived from law and former ﬁndings
mothers (fathers) are the preferred custodians for female (male) minors.29 Mothers are
the preferred custodians for young children and in general Austrian legal practice prefers
homemakers as custodians, since they have already demonstrated that they manage to
take care of the child. The estimation results for the period before (columns3 and 4 in
Table9) indeed show that if the minor in question is a girl, the father is less likely to
become custodian (by about two percentage points). Further, as expected the probability
that he gets custody increases with the child’s age30 and decreases with the mother being
a homemaker (by about minus three percentage points). For the period after the reform
(columns 5 and 6 in Table9) we ﬁnd a comparable eﬀects of the child’s age and the mother
being a homemaker. However, the child’s sex seems to play no role anymore.
Income & education High-income parents may cope more easily with the higher cost of
divorce by fault than parents with lower income. Therefore, the utility equivalent of the
monetary cost of disagreement of a high-income parent may be lower than that of a low-
income parent. This leads to a higher valuation of the outside option and should thereby
increase the probability that the high-income parent gets her/his preferred agreement. On
the other hand, a high-income parent may face higher opportunity cost of taking care of
the child. This may lead to a reversed utility ordering, where, for instance, this parent
prefers the other to be the resident parent in a joint custody. The estimation results for the
period before the reform suggest that in the case of mothers the second eﬀect dominates.
An increase in the mother’s income slightly raises the probability that the father gets
custody.31 The father’s income has no statistically signiﬁcant impact. Possibly, the two
countervailing eﬀects cancel each other out. After the reform neither the mother’s nor the
father’s income has an impact on the residence decision. With respect to the mother, this
change is plausible, since under joint custody the eﬀect of the opportunity cost of time
may be less crucial. The parents’ education has no eﬀect in any period.
Lawyers According to Austrian law divorcees are free to hire a lawyer. During the
time period covering our data it was also possible for divorcing couples to hire a joint
lawyer.32 Therefore, we have to distinguish ﬁve diﬀerent cases: neither parent has a
lawyer, parents have a joint lawyer, both parents have a lawyer each, only the mother
has a lawyer and only the father has a lawyer. In our estimations we include a binary
variable for each case where the base group is equal to couples without any lawyer. The
29In the following we embrace by the term custodian/custodianship both – the custodian under the sole
custody regime and the resident parent under a joint custody.
30An increase in the minor’s age from half a standard deviation below the mean to half a standard
deviation above the mean (i.e. from about 7.4 to about 12.5 years) increases the probability of the father
being the custodian by nearly three percentage points.
31An increase in the mother’s income from half a standard deviation below the mean to half a standard
deviation above the mean (i.e. from e461 to e803) increases the probability that the father gets custody
by one percentage point.
32On 1st of January 2005 a new draft of the so-called Non-Contentious Proceedings Act entered into
force and repealed the possibility of joint lawyers.
17estimation results for the period before the reform show a higher probability of getting
custody for fathers who are they only parent who has retained a lawyer compared to
fathers of couples who have no lawyer at all (about plus 5 percentage points). The reversed
eﬀect is true for mothers (minus 2 percentage points). We do not observe a statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the involvement of lawyers on the custody allocation if parents have
a separate lawyer each. It seems that if both parents hire a lawyer their eﬀects cancel
out. There is also no impact of a joint lawyer. Although these results seem to be very
suggestive it is not clear whether the statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects are indeed due to
a causal eﬀect of lawyers or rather due to a systematic selection of couples with fairly
diﬀerent characteristics into speciﬁc situations.33 In the sample after the reform we face
the problem of separation (Albert and Anderson, 1984): The variable ‘only the mother
has a lawyer’ perfectly predicts the outcome, i.e. in every case where only the mother had
a lawyer she became custodian/resident parent. Fortunately, separation has in the case of
a bivariate probit model not as severe consequences as in the conventional probit model,
where either the aﬀected variable or observations have to be dropped in order to ﬁt the
model (Zorn, 2005). We still can estimate our bivariate probit model with the full set of
covariates and observations. However, the coeﬃcient and standard errors of the variable
‘only the mother has a lawyer’ are upward biased. Compared to the period before the
reform, we do not observe a statistical signiﬁcant impact of the father’s lawyer and in
the case where both parents have a lawyer the mother’s lawyer outperforms the father’s
lawyer. This suggest that the joint custody reform has increased the relative power of
mother’s lawyers. Alternatively, the reform may have changed the sex-speciﬁc selection
into legal representation.
Alimony In our basic speciﬁcation we do not control for alimony payments. The allocation
of custody and alimony payments may be simultaneously determined and consequently
alimony payments are a potentially endogenous variable. However, if we add the alimony
payment to the wife as an additional explanatory variable the qualitative results of all
other covariates are unchanged in all estimations (see Table10)34. This indicates that we
do not have a problem of omitted variable bias in our estimation results. The coeﬃcient
of the alimony payment itself is throughout negative and statistically signiﬁcant in the
estimation for the whole period and in the period before the reform. However, since there
is no obvious way to ﬁx the endogeneity problem of alimony we do not stress this result.
The results from this section show that the introduction of joint custody had no impact
on the probability that minors are living with their mothers after divorce. However, we
observe some diﬀerences in the determinants of the main place of residence. In general,
these changes may be due to two reasons. Firstly, the availability of joint custody may
33For a detailed discussion of the role of lawyers in divorce processes see Halla (2007).
34In the estimation for the whole period the dummy for the period after the reform, the number of children
and the dummy indicating a female judge carry one asterisk – indicating a statistically signiﬁcance at a
10-percent level – after controlling for alimony. Please note, the p-values of these coeﬃcients (0.104, 0.104
and 0.101) have been pretty much the same before controlling for alimony.
18have an impact on parent’s way of bargaining over the allocation of custody. Secondly,
since the custody reform has increased the share of divorces by mutually consent, we
observe a potentially diﬀerent population of divorcing couples after the reform. However,
since the share of this additional parents is comparable small the latter explanation seems
to be less likely. In sum, we interpret the results as indicating that the introduction of
joint custody had a mediating eﬀect on the bargaining process over custody after divorce
without changing the ﬁnal resident allocation.35
3.4 Who takes joint custody?
Who are the 45 percent of all couples who agree on joint custody after the reform? In
order to answer this question we examine the second equation of our bivariate probit
model for the period after the reform (see Columns10 to 12 of Table9). Most strikingly,
the estimation results show that any involvement of lawyers has a tremendously negative
eﬀect on an agreement on joint custody. We observe a reduced probability (compared
to the case without any lawyer) of 20 percentage points if only the mother has a lawyer,
minus 16 percentage points if only the father has a lawyer and minus 22 percentage points if
parents have a separate lawyer each or a joint lawyer. Again, these negative correlation can
be explained by a true causal eﬀect of lawyers or by a systematic selection of parents with
distinct characteristics into speciﬁc situations. For instance, it seems plausible that parents
with grave conﬂicts are more likely to hire lawyers and would have not agreed on joint
custody in the counterfactual situation without any lawyers. The second important results
is that the probability of a joint custody arrangement increases with the parents’ income.
Again, this result suggests sorting. Parents with a higher socio-economic status and higher
abilities self-select them into joint custody. Surprisingly, the parents’ education has no
statistically signiﬁcant impact. Moreover, we ﬁnd that the probability of join custody
increases with mother’s age and decreases with the number of the father’s prior marriages.
Taken together, the results suggest that parents with favorable characteristics self-select
themselves into joint custody. This ﬁnding is crucially important for studies examining
the eﬀects of joint custody on child-outcomes. Apart from that we ﬁnd some evidence that
female judges seem to be biased against joint custody and manage to inﬂuence parents
in their decision. A female judge reduces the likelihood of an agreement on joint custody
by about seven percentage points. This eﬀect can be interpreted causally since couples
are matched randomly to judges. Finally, the year dummies reveal a trend towards joint
custody over time. The purpose of this small section is simply to highlight the fact that
35In order to check the robustness of our results concerning the imputation procedure we did the es-
timation analysis based on the smaller sample with complete income information for both parents. The
results for the whole period and for the period before the reform are very similar to the results reported
in Table9. The eﬀect of the parents’ income is unchanged, only the statistical signiﬁcance of some control
variables changes. An estimation of the bivariate probit model for the period after the reform based on
this sample cannot be realized, since no convergence is achieved. This is caused by the few cases in this
sample where the father is the sole custodian (11) or resident parent under joint custody (10).
19couples with joint custody are selected group. It may be the case that empirical studies
neglecting this fact are biased due to confounding factors and overestimate the positive
eﬀect of joint custody. An promising way to disentangle causal eﬀects of joint custody on
future child outcomes is given by diﬀerent timing of custody law reforms across countries.
The timing of the introduction of joint custody regimes across European countries would
allow such a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences analysis. Similarly Teng Wah (2006) exploits the
variation across the Unites States to study the impact of joint custody on educational
attainment.
4 Summary & conclusions
We have modeled the allocation of custody at the time of divorce as bargaining between
parents with alternating oﬀers and a ﬁnite horizon for two diﬀerent custody regimes.
First we assume a sole custody regime. In a second step we introduce joint custody as
an additional option. We have shown that some parents, who would not be able to ﬁnd
a custody agreement in the ﬁrst regime, can ﬁnd an agreement after the joint custody
reform. Empirical evidence based on a recent joint custody reform in Austria supports
our model. Exploiting the control group nature of couples without minors we ﬁnd that
the introduction of joint custody has increased the fraction of divorces by mutual consent.
Based on rich micro data of court records we inspect the bargaining process of divorces
by mutual consent before and after this reform. The custody reform has not changed the
odds that children are mainly living with their mothers, however, some determinants of
the custody allocation are altered.
Given our ﬁndings we support the introduction of joint custody. Joint custody has me-
diating eﬀects on the divorce process and enables facilitating cooperation among parents.
This, in turn, minimizes both private and public cost of litigation. Furthermore, the
circumvention of painful adversary proceedings and of substantial delays induced by con-
tested judicial proceedings reduces emotional stress. Above all, consensual solutions are
by deﬁnition more consistent with the preferences of each parent, and should thereby lead
to an outcome that is more stable over time than a result imposed by a judge. The fact
that female judges distract couples to take joint custody should be observe and discussed
by the judicial profession.
Whether joint custody has apart from the mediating inﬂuence on the divorce process
desirable eﬀects after divorce is an open issue and deserves further research. However, our
court data clearly shows that parents who agree on joint custody are a highly selected
group. Future research on post-divorce outcomes has to take this into account.
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22Appendix A
In Case3, it is a priori not clear which of the two possible agreements x∗
i or x∗
j the parents
will choose. The outcome depends on their relative bargaining power, i.e. who can make
the last/ﬁrst proposal and on their relative (im)patience.In the following we characterize
four sub-cases which result from diﬀerent combinations of who can make the last proposal
and the impatience of the parents.
Deﬁnition Impatience of a parent i means, that there is a critical time span zi for which
(x∗
i,t + zi) i (x∗
j,t).
Therefore, parent i having her/his way after the critical time span zi leads to a lower (or
equal) utility for parent i than letting the other parent have her/his way now. Hence, it is
not credible for parent i to reject x∗
j now, if s/he could get x∗
i only after the critical time
span zi.
Case3.1 If parent i with the last proposal is suﬃciently patient, i.e. zi > tC − 1 and
therefore (x∗
i,tC − 1) i (x∗
j,0), then the parents agree on x∗
i immediately – independent
of parent j’s patience.
In the penultimate period, when the last proposal is made, the not-proposing parent j will
agree to x∗
i, because it is still better than having to go to court in the next period. The
parents know that parent j with the penultimate proposal will ﬁnally give in, therefore
they agree on x∗
i immediately.
Case3.2 If parent i with the last proposal is not suﬃciently patient, i.e. zi ≤ tC −1 and
therefore (x∗
i,tC − 1) i (x∗
j,1), but parent j is suﬃciently patient, then the parents agree
on x∗
j immediately.36
In this case parent i has an advantage due to the last proposal, but s/he cannot use
it, because it is not credible for her/him to wait until the penultimate period (with the
last proposal). The reason for this is that accepting the proposal of the other parent in
period 0 or period 1 leads to (at least) as much utility as having x∗
i in the penultimate
period. Therefore, parent i cannot credibly reject, if parent j proposes x∗
j in the beginning
(or in period 1). Parent i will even propose x∗
j her/himself, to save the cost of waiting.
If both parents are (suﬃciently) impatient, so that the other parent’s preferred possible
agreement now yields at least as much utility as the own preferred possible agreement
in the penultimate period, then there are two possible outcomes: If one parent is more
patient than the other parent, then the more patient parent will have her/his way. If
both parents are equally impatient, then the parent with the ﬁrst move will get her/his
preferred possible agreement.
36We have to include period 1 here. If parent j has the ﬁrst proposal and parent i could become credible
by waiting one period, then parent i would get her/his way.
23Case3.3a If both parents are not suﬃciently patient, i.e. (x∗
i,tC − 1) i (x∗
j,1), and
parent i is more patient then parent j, i.e. zi > zj + 1, then the parents agree on x∗
i
immediately – independent of who can make the last proposal.
The reason is that parent j will not get the consent of parent i during zj. Parent i may or
may not consent to x∗
j after zj – it does not matter for parent j, for whom it is in any case
better to consent to x∗
i now (and it would not be credible to do otherwise). Parent i on
the other hand can credibly threaten to wait longer than zj, but not long enough for the
last proposal. This does not matter though, parent j will consent to x∗
i as soon as parent
i proposes it. Parent j will even propose x∗






Case3.3b If both parents are not suﬃciently patient, i.e. (x∗
i,tC − 1) i (x∗
j,1), and
both parents are (nearly) equally impatient, i.e. zi = zj or zi = zj ± 1, then the parents
agree on x∗
i (x∗
j) immediately if parent i (parent j) makes the ﬁrst proposal.
In this case both parents know that they cannot get their preferred possible agreement
within their critical time spans. Therefore, each parent has an incentive to propose the
own preferred possible agreement, but also to consent to the preferred possible agreement
of the other parent, as soon as it is proposed, because they cannot increase their utility by
waiting. Parent m (who by assumption makes the ﬁrst proposal) proposes x∗
m and parent
f agrees to it.
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